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NOTAS
SOBRE
MIGRACIÓN Y
DESIGUALDADES

Does Migration Cause
Income Inequality?
EVIDENCE FROM MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES*

Pia M. Orrenius | Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Madeline Zavodny | University of North Florida

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I

nequality has been rising across the world in
recent decades. Latin America has been an
exception to what otherwise seems to be the
prevalent trend in the U.S., Europe and Asia. In
the U.S. the rise in inequality since the 1970s
has coincided with the rise in Mexican immigration. In Mexico, inequality has been declining since the mid-1990s, a period during which
emigration to the U.S. first increased to historic
highs and then declined steeply.
Our review of the literature suggests that
low-skilled immigration to the U.S., much
of it from Mexico, has only played a minor
role in rising income and wage inequality. To
the extent that there is an effect, it has come
through the presence of immigrants, and less
as a result of immigration’s effect on natives’
wages. Immigrants’ bimodal skill distribution,

*

with clustering at the top and bottom of the
U.S. skill distribution, has widened the overall
income distribution slightly.
At the same time, low-skilled immigration to
the U.S. and migrants’ remittances have played
a large role in lowering global inequality by
moving millions of low-income Mexican families further away from poverty and closer to the
global middle class. Migration also has broader economic benefits in the destination for employers and consumers, especially in light of the
aging of the U.S. workforce and rising labor
force needs. Hence, our policy recommendations include boosting legal employment-based
migration from Mexico to the U.S. We also suggest a host of other initiatives that can decrease
inequality, such as increasing education outcomes, workforce training and access to credit.

The views expressed here are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.
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INTRODUCTION
Mexico-U.S. migration has trended sharply upward for the better part of the last four decades.
Income inequality has also risen in the United
States and declined in Mexico over roughly the
same period.1 Are the two trends causally related?
Has emigration from Mexico increased income inequality in the U.S. while lowering it in Mexico?
From an international perspective, migration
from poor to rich countries lowers global inequality by significantly increasing the wages of
those who are otherwise near the bottom of the
world distribution of income. From an economic
perspective, reducing global inequality is far more
important than what happens within any one
country. From a political economy perspective,
however, what happens within countries may be
all that voters care about and therefore influences immigration policy.2 Voters and lawmakers in
destination countries appear to put little weight
on the so-called global gains from migration—
the increase in world productivity and output
that would follow if workers could freely migrate
across international borders.3
The potential economic gains from liberalization of immigration are massive; complete freedom of movement could more than double world
GDP.4 Yet these gains remain largely unrealized because of barriers to international migration. Poverty is a barrier to migration for some, but government-erected barriers are far more important.
Mexico-U.S. immigration has historically been unusual because it occurred on a large scale despite
government-erected barriers to migration. In the
more recent period, however, such barriers appear
to have become binding, and Mexico-U.S. migration has slowed to a trickle partly as a result.

Public and political opinion around immigration focuses on domestic effects of international
migration, particularly whether it helps or hurts
relatively low-wage natives. In an era of rising inequality in the U.S. and many other industrialized
nations, it may be tempting to attribute rising inequality to immigration. In Mexico, inequality
has fallen in the last two decades, and there is
little research on how that is related to first the
rise and then the fall in emigration during this
time. Whether it’s the U.S. or Mexico, our review
of the inequality literature suggests a host of other contemporaneous trends have played a larger
role in driving changes in income inequality, most
notably globalization in the form of international
trade and skill-biased technological change.
In this article, we explore recent trends in
Mexico-U.S. migration and inequality in the two
countries. We provide an overview of the economic effects of immigration and emigration in
the Mexico-U.S. case. We find that while Mexican migration may have slightly reduced wages
for some U.S. workers and slightly increased inequality in the U.S., it raised wages in Mexico.
There is some evidence that by raising wages for
the lower middle class and stimulating remittances, migration may have lowered Mexican
income inequality in recent years once direct and
indirect effects are accounted for, but more research is needed.
Given that migration plays only a small role
in inequality trends and is beneficial on net for
migrants, sending communities, and destination
countries, public policy should focus on reducing
migration barriers and making international mobility more efficient and less costly.
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TRENDS IN MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION
Mexico-U.S. migration goes back well over a century. It is deeply rooted in a recurring theme: U.S.
employers’ need for workers.5 Whether it was the
building of the railroads, settling and farming
the western frontier, or bolstering the workforce
during and after World War II, Mexican workers
were in high demand north of the border. But while
inflows were substantial, estimated at 450,000 per
year during the height of the Bracero period, return migration was high as well.6 Mexican workers came largely for seasonal work, leaving their
families in Mexico and returning there once their
employment stints concluded.
Patterns of return migration among Mexican
immigrants began to switch to permanent settlement in the 1970s and 1980s. The change came
after the Bracero program ended in 1964 and
the 1965 U.S. immigration law limited permanent immigration from the western Hemisphere,
including Mexico. Reduced avenues to migrate

legally at the same time as the Mexico population was undergoing a demographic boom and
the U.S. economy was growing, launched an era
of mass undocumented migration. The increase in
unauthorized immigration was followed by a successive buildup in border enforcement as well as
a major amnesty in 1986 that granted permanent
residence to over 2 million Mexican immigrants.
At the same time, the U.S. economy was undergoing structural changes that beckoned additional workers. The accelerated transition to a service-based economy after recessions in the 1970s
and early 1980s led to a rise in year-round opportunities for low-skilled workers. Mexico-U.S.
migration continued to rise throughout the 1990s
and into the 2000s as migrant networks facilitated
migration, and U.S. employers came to depend on
immigrant workers. The Mexico-born population
living in the United States rose from 760,000 in
1970 to a peak of 12.7 million in 2007 (Figure 1).
The cumulative effects of such rapid increases
in immigration are considerable. By 2007, over

FIGURE 1. Mexico-born Population in the United States, 1850-2015
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SOURCES: For Mexican-born 1850 to 1980: Gibson, Campbell and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the
United States: 1850-2000,” U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Working Paper No. 81, 2006; for 1980 and 1990: Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA); for 1995 to 2003: Pew Hispanic Center estimates based on augmented March Current Population Surveys and
2000 Decennial Census; for 2005 to 2015: Pew Research Center analysis of American Community Survey (1% IPUMS).
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10 percent of the Mexico population lived in the
U.S. Today, about one-quarter of U.S. immigrants
are from Mexico; it’s by far the largest source
country. While recent inflows of Mexican immigrants are greatly diminished from their peak in
the late 1990s and early 2000s, they are still sizable, at around 140,000 new arrivals per year.7
Nonetheless, the Mexico-born population in the
U.S. has declined since the 2007-2009 Great Recession, implying that inflows are closely matched
by outflows.8
It bears noting that a large share of Mexican
immigration has historically been undocumented,
which may explain how it has grown so quickly
and why it has ebbed and flowed with the U.S.
business cycle.9 It has been less encumbered by
the immigration bureaucracy, at least on the front
end, than inflows from other nations.

TRENDS IN INEQUALITY
Concurrent with the rise in emigration from Mexico and subsequent immigration of Mexicans into

the U.S., there has been a steep rise in income inequality in the U.S. and a modest decline in Mexico (Figure 2). Mexico, with a Gini coefficient of
0.48, has higher income inequality than the U.S.
(Gini coefficient of 0.42).10 However, the trends
in the chart show that the gap is growing smaller;
inequality in the two nations appears to be converging. The evolution of inequality in Mexico is
also more varied than in the U.S.; it rises from
the 1980s until the mid-1990s and then declines.
Other Latin American countries also saw falling
income inequality in the 2000s, bucking a global
trend of rising inequality. 11
A large literature documents rising inequality in the U.S. and many other nations over the
last three to four decades. Even nations with aggressive redistribution policies, such as the Scandinavian countries, have experienced growing
inequality. Higher inequality is caused by an increasing ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled wages, but the drivers of this growing gap are likely
a combination of factors. These drivers fall into
two major camps, one focused on the forces of

FIGURE 2. Inequality in the United States and Mexico: 1980-2015
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globalization and the other on skill-biased technological change.

Globalization

Some studies place economic and financial globalization at the heart of the factors driving the
increase in the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled
wages, arguing that globalization has created more opportunities for high-skilled workers
while exposing low-skilled workers (primarily in
advanced economies) to competition from foreign (cheaper) labor and eroding their bargaining
power.12
Globalization involves increased flows of
goods, people, and capital across international
borders; the increase in flows of goods and capital has far outstripped the increase in international migration. Labor market institutions that
might have helped shield low-skilled workers
from the effects of globalization have weakened
in some countries. In the U.S., for example, the
erosion of the real minimum wage and a decline
in unionization have contributed to falling wages
at the bottom of the income distribution.13
At the same time, the globalization of production has likely also increased corporate profits
(the return to capital), which has led to higher
asset prices (for stocks, property, and land), factors that inflate executive pay and boost wealth
inequality as well as income inequality, especially
in advanced economies.14
In emerging market economies, meanwhile, increased foreign investment and production have
lifted the wages of low- and mid-skilled workers
relative to their counterparts in advanced economies15. While liberalization of trade and investment was initially blamed for rising income
inequality in Mexico,16 recent research reaches
more nuanced conclusions. After 2000, Mexican
income inequality began to steadily decline, and
the middle class began to grow.17

Skill-biased technological change

Next to globalization, skill-biased technological change is one of the most cited explanations
for increased wage inequality since the 1970s.
Early studies noted that firms’ ability to increasingly substitute technology for workers reduced
the demand for low-skilled workers, depressing

their wages.18 Over time, however, this hypothesis proved inconsistent with what emerged as a
U-shaped pattern of labor market polarization.
Polarization involves falling employment shares
of mid-skill occupations amid rising shares of
low- and high-skilled occupations, or an hourglass-shaped distribution of jobs with regard to
skill. A modified version of the skill-biased technological change hypothesis emphasized that technological change complements abstract (high-education) tasks while substituting for routine (middle-education) tasks.19 Later work showed that
this model held not just for the U.S., but also for
16 Western European countries, and was a much
more important factor than offshoring—a key
part of globalization—in explaining polarization.20 More recent work has coined the phrase
‘routine-biased technological change’ to better
describe the hollowing out of employment in occupations with routine-type functions.21
It bears noting that globalization also does
not fit well with the pattern of labor market polarization in advanced economies. According to
Lake and Millimet (2016), routine-biased technological change can fully explain polarization,
whereas the trade effect is negative across the
board, affecting low- and high-skilled workers as
much as mid-skilled workers.22 They find that it’s
the vulnerability of locations that is driving the
adverse effects of trade, not the types of occupations or workers’ skills. If their hypothesis bears
out, the policy implications are clear, namely to
retrain workers in vulnerable areas, not in vulnerable occupations.

MIGRATION’S EFFECT ON INEQUALITY
Migration fits into both the globalization and
technological change hypotheses above. In addition to trade in goods and services, globalization
encompasses the movement of factors of production, including labor (migration) and capital (investment). A standard two-country model of migration dictates that workers should move from
the labor-rich country where wages are relatively low to the labor-scarce country where wages
are relatively high. This describes the Mexico-US
case rather well, at least up until the 2007-2009
Great Recession. The resultant effects on income
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inequality in the origin and the destination depend on where the migrants fall in the two countries’ income distributions and also on the effect
of migration on the wages of other workers.
Migration may be related to skill-biased technological change as well. An influx of low-skilled
workers may slow the adoption of labor-saving
technology by firms; an influx of high-skilled
workers may accelerate it. Low- and high-skilled
immigrants may be complements or substitutes
for native workers, potentially increasing or reducing their wages. To the extent that immigrants
lower the cost of the goods and services they produce, they can spur job creation at the extremes
of the skill distribution, contributing to the
U-shaped pattern of polarization of employment.

The U.S. Case

Immigrants to the U.S. are at the two ends of the
skill distribution. Immigrants from Mexico and
developing countries tend to be at the bottom,
while immigrants from most of Asia, particularly
China and India, tend to be at the top. Figure 3
shows the share of US workers who are foreign
born by education level. Immigrants are over represented among high school dropouts and those
with professional and graduate degrees. Given
this pattern, immigration seems unlikely to be directly related to what is happening in the middle
of the skill distribution.
Mass low-skilled immigration (much of it from
Mexico) into the U.S. in the 1980s, 1990s, and
early 2000s likely had a negative, albeit small,
impact on the wages of similarly low-skilled natives.23 A survey of the evidence indicates that statistically significant negative wage and employment effects on natives are generally only found
among high school dropouts, who are a shrinking
share of the U.S.-born labor force.24
The fact that wage and employment effects, to
the extent that they occur, affect the least-educated
native workers, is also inconsistent with immigration contributing to the disappearance of mid-skill
jobs, the cornerstone of the polarization hypothesis. Of course, immigration is not totally separate
from labor market polarization. For example, it’s
likely that large inflows of low-skilled immigrants
contributed to rising employment shares in lowskilled occupations since immigrants provide the

types of services that have experienced rising demand. They may even contribute to rising employment in high-skilled occupations to the extent that
they lower the costs of services that, for example,
high-skilled married women need to go back to
work, such as child care.25
Card (2009) is one of the few studies that directly addresses the question of immigration’s impact on U.S. wage inequality.26 He argues that immigration has had a negligible impact on inequality among U.S. natives, largely because immigration has only had minor effects on wage differences across U.S. natives in different skill groups.
Nevertheless, overall U.S. wage inequality is higher than it would be without immigration due to
compositional effects. Immigrants are clustered
at the high and low ends of the education distribution and have higher residual wage inequality
than natives; hence their presence accounted for
about 5 percent of the increase in wage inequality
between 1980 and 2005, according to Card.
Card’s findings are consistent with the consensus report by the National Academies (2016) and
several other studies.27 Rienzo (2014) also finds
that residual wage inequality is higher among immigrants than among natives, but that immigration
has not been the major force behind the increase
in such inequality in the U.S. (or the UK).28 Gould
(2015) agrees that the direct effect of immigration
on inequality is not significant, but in areas experiencing a manufacturing decline, an influx of lowskilled immigrants tends to increase inequality.29
Hibbs and Hong (2015) do not consider wages, but rather correlations of changes in the Gini
index with immigrant shares in U.S. metropolitan areas.30 They conclude that immigration between 1990 and 2000 explains 24 percent of the
increase in overall income inequality during this
time; however, they find that low-skilled immigration, as proxied by Mexican immigration,
played no role in this increase. In their study of
the same time period but considering only rural
U.S. counties, Parrado and Kandel (2010) find little relationship between growth in the Hispanic
population and changes in income inequality.31
George Borjas is a long-time critic of the
cross-area (spatial) analysis that most studies
rely on to estimate the wage, employment, and
inequality effects of immigration. He argues that
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FIGURE 3. Share Foreign-Born Workers in U.S. Labor Force by Education
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natives leave areas that experience immigration
in a way that biases spatial estimates away from
finding an adverse impact on natives. In Aydemir
and Borjas (2007), the authors estimate wage and
employment effects at the national level and find
much larger negative wage effects on U.S. natives
than do other studies.32 Of course, their approach,
while not subject to spatial bias, requires making
more assumptions about the composition of education/experience groups and who competes with
whom. These statistical modeling constraints
tend to result in more-adverse wage effects than
is found in studies that do not impose such strict
assumptions. In any case, Aydemir and Borjas
(2007) conclude that low-skilled immigration
to the US has accounted for about one-fifth of
the decline in the real wages of high school dropout men between 1980 and 2000.33 Low-skilled
immigration has therefore contributed to higher
wage inequality but, again, it has not been a primary driver.

The Mexican Case

If migration lowers wages for competing workers
in the destination country, it should raise wages for comparable workers in the origin country.
Several studies find positive wage effects as a
consequence of Mexican emigration to the U.S.
Mishra (2007) estimates that 16 percent of the
Mexican labor force was working in the U.S. in
2000, and the outflow of Mexican workers to the
U.S. between 1970 and 2000 increased the wage
of the average Mexican worker by 8 percent.34
One might be tempted to conclude that higher
wages in the wake of emigration reduces income
inequality, but it is not so straightforward. The impact on inequality depends on where the emigrants
are in the skill/wage distribution. The Roy model, a favorite tool of economists studying migrant
selection, predicts that migrants from Mexico to
the U.S. will be negatively selected, drawn from
the bottom of the skill/wage distribution.35 The
early empirical research on self-selection, howev-
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er, found that Mexican migrants’ education levels
were about average or, in other words, not that
different from non-migrants.36 Later work that
considered wages rather than education, found
some evidence of negative selection.37
One rationale for why the Roy model may
have failed to hold in the Mexican case is discussed by McKenzie and Rapoport (2007), who
posit that the ability to pay the costs of migration
is correlated with skill, and low-skill workers simply cannot afford to migrate.38 The authors proxy
for the costs of migration with access to migrant
networks and find that, indeed, Mexican migrants
from villages with extensive migrant networks
are more negatively selected than those from vi-

llages with limited migrant networks. This evolution of migrant networks and the impact on the
skill levels of migrants has potentially important
effects on inequality. As migrants become increasingly negatively selected, the positive wage effects
should move down the skill distribution and reduce inequality. No empirical work that we know
of has demonstrated this effect, however.
Mishra (2007) and Aydemir and Borjas (2007)
both extend their analyses of the positive wage
effects of emigration to estimate the impact on
Mexican wage inequality in 1990-2000.39 They
both find that while emigration increased the
wages of high school dropouts, their wages still
declined relative to high school graduates, with

The Texas Case
Texas is the second most popular destination
after California for Mexican immigrants. There
were about 2.7 million immigrants from Mexico
living in Texas in 2016; they make up 52 percent
of the state’s immigrant population.59 Mexican
immigrants in Texas have relatively low levels of
education, much like they do in the rest of the
U.S. and are concentrated in relatively low-wage
sectors such as construction, leisure and hospitality, agriculture, and domestic service. A significant share of Mexican immigrants in Texas is
undocumented, perhaps over one-half.
Mexican immigration to Texas sped up in the
1970s and 1980s, years when the oil sector was
booming and other parts of the U.S. were in recession. Although immigration slowed when the oil
price collapsed in 1986, it picked up again in the
1990s. Between 1990 and 2010, the immigrant
share of the state population rose from 9 to 16
percent, much of that driven by Mexico.60 At the

same time, employment grew at twice the rate of
the nation while wages kept pace with the nation
despite the large influx of workers.
Periods of rapid economic growth are often
accompanied by higher inequality, yet most measures suggest that inequality in Texas did not
grow as fast as it did in the rest of the nation.
The income share of the top 1 percent increased
in Texas between 1979 and 2007 but not as fast
as in the rest of the nation.61 State-level Gini coefficients also suggest that Texas inequality has
lagged the increases in other large states since
1970 (Figure 4).
In sum, the Texas experience suggests Mexican immigration did not materially contribute
to increased income inequality in the state. If it
had been a major contributor, Texas measures of
inequality should have been as high as or higher
than those of the other large states.
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migration accounting for over one-third of the
change. The counterintuitive result may partly be
an artifact of the short and unique time period
under study, 1990-2000.40 Another problem is
the definition of educational categories.
U.S. researchers tend to lump all low-skilled
workers into a ‘high school dropout’ category for
comparability with the U.S. and Canada labor
markets. But this is not appropriate in the Mexican case where, since the 1970s, the modal educational category was initially primary school (6 to
8 years of school)41 and then secondary school (9
to 11 years education).42 In other words, the great
majority of Mexican workers still today have less
than a high school diploma. To capture the effect

on income inequality would require breaking up
the ‘high school dropout’ group into much finer
gradations.
Studies of migration and inequality in the
Mexican case also do not consider the compositional impact of mass emigration of middle-class
Mexicans on wage inequality. The great majority
of migrants had between 6 and 11 years of education, putting many of them in the middle class
there (although in the lower socioeconomic class
in the U.S.). This exodus must have created a hole
in the income distribution that resulted in more
wage inequality despite raising wages on average.
In general, there is a need for additional studies
on Mexican emigration and changes in inequality.

FIGURE 4. Inequality Rises More Slowly in Texas than in Other Large States
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Moreover, given recent Mexican trends, more research is needed on the economic effects of return
migration and rising Central American migration.
From 2009-2014, one million Mexicans and their
families returned to Mexico, some involuntarily.43
There is mixed evidence on the success of their
reintegration.44 And although the volume of Central American migration is small at the national
level, there are significant inflows of Guatemalan
workers in Chiapas, for instance.45

Role of Remittances

Remittances, migrants’ money transfers back
home, represent an additional way in which migration can affect inequality. Mexico is the largest recipient of remittances in Latin America and
took in a record $29 billion in 2017.46 Remittances, while sizable, represent only about 2.7 percent of Mexico GDP, since it’s a large economy.
In poorer states with heavy emigration, however,
the impact is much larger. Remittances represent
11.1 and 9.5 percent of GDP in Michoacán and
Guerrero, respectively.47
About three-quarters of Mexico remittances
go to households in the bottom half of the income
distribution, which suggests they have a role to
play in suppressing income inequality.48 In addition, remittances make up over half of the income
of the poorest decile of Mexican households.
Studies that measure the effect of remittances
on poverty and inequality tend to show the impacts are helpful but small; for example, in Latin America on average, a 1 percentage point increase in remittances as a share of GDP reduces
inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient)
by about 0.08 percent and poverty by 0.37 percent.49 In the Mexican case, receiving remittances
reduces a household’s probability of being in poverty by 6 to 10 percentage points.50 The evidence
on inequality is more mixed, however. Mora-Rivera (2005) shows that international remittances increase the Gini coefficient in rural Mexican
communities.51
Arslan and Taylor (2012) find that the impact
of remittances on rural inequality depends on the
extent of migration prevalence in the community.52 At lower levels, remittances ‘equalize’ the
income distribution; at higher levels, they have
the opposite effect. Meanwhile, Orrenius et al.

(2012) use state-level data to show that remittances likely decrease wage inequality; remittances reduce the share of lowest-paid workers, those
earning one minimum wage, and raise the share
of higher-paid workers, those earning either 2-3
or 3-5 times the minimum wage.53 There are additional benefits in high-migration states, where
remittances also increase employment and reduce
the unemployment rate.

INEQUALITY’S EFFECT ON MIGRATION
Throughout this policy brief, we have focused on
the impact of migration on inequality but there
is a literature that posits the causality can also
run the other way. Relative deprivation captures
the idea that a household’s relative income rather
than its absolute income can also spur migration.
Stark and Taylor (1989) find evidence that family
members migrate in order to improve their household’s income position relative to households in
their reference group.54 Controlling for expected
absolute income changes, the greater a household’s initial relative deprivation, the higher the
probability of Mexico-U.S. migration. The exception occurs at the very bottom of the community’s income distribution, likely among households
that cannot afford to migrate.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Inequality has many roots, and it’s not always bad.
For example, periods of rapid economic growth
are often accompanied by higher inequality, while
recessions are typically accompanied by declining
inequality. We clearly should not engineer recessions in order to suppress inequality. Under communism, people were equally poor; again, not a
worthwhile tradeoff. The eradication of inequality
should not be a policy maker’s primary goal.
Instead, policymakers should focus on getting
society closer to equality of opportunity, also referred to as income or socioeconomic mobility.
Is a child who is born poor doomed to always
be poor, or does he have a realistic shot at joining the middle class? There are a number of policy prescriptions that apply to safeguarding or
spurring income mobility, including early childhood education for at-risk kids and high-quality
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public schools. Workforce training and apprenticeship programs can help workers adjust to
labor market changes. Safety net programs can
sustain families who are hit by shocks, such as
unemployment or a health crisis. Financial literacy and innovative banking regulations can boost
access to credit. Payments that help people move
to areas where jobs are plentiful, from areas
where they are not, can help spur socioeconomic
mobility with a country.
Mexico’s period of falling income inequality
coincides with a number of these policy initiatives and their associated outcomes. For example, Mexico has experienced rising educational
attainment. Federal and local authorities have
also worked on extending the social safety net
with both welfare programs (Prospera, previously known as Oportunidades) and universal health
care (Seguro Popular).55 More recent reforms to
bring workers into the formal sector where they
are covered by government benefits, such as social security, are also helpful. And banking regulators have been aggressive in developing blueprints for new types of financial institutions that
specialize in lending to low-income families and
small businesses.56
We can add managed migration to this list of policy prescriptions. Whether it’s a temporary worker
program or other arrangement, legal and employment-based migration can be a win-win for sending
and destination country. After all, Mexico-US migration has created millions of middle class families
in the US among people who originally came from
modest means in Mexico. International migration is
a large, effective anti-poverty program that doesn’t
cost the government much additional resources
and, at the same time, generates gains for consumers and businesses who employ these workers.
One concern might be that migration, while
adding workers and consumers to the U.S. economy, subtracts them from the Mexican economy. There are two ways to mitigate this concern.
One is through remittances, which studies have
shown more than make up for the lost income
of migrant workers who have left Mexico (GDP
lost to emigration). Another is to implement migration programs that encourage return migration. Migrants who are intent on returning will
invest in Mexico, whether it’s buying a house,

paying taxes or otherwise contributing to economic development in their home communities,
through programs like Tres por Uno, or at other
destinations.
Additional solutions that have been proposed
in the U.S. include more funding for community
colleges, state mandated parental leave, and child
care subsidies. Some academics have proposed
programs to compensate native workers who lose
out from immigration. These programs exist for
workers displaced by trade and could be set up
for workers that could show they were adversely
impacted by immigration.57
Last but not least, a comprehensive approach
to immigration and inequality has to address the
large undocumented immigrant population in the
U.S. These immigrants are unlikely to return to
Mexico, and their lack of legal status adversely
affects not only their wages and employment, but
also the socioeconomic outcomes and income
mobility of their U.S.-born children.58

FINAL REMARKS
Inequality has been rising across the world in recent decades. Latin America has been an exception
to what otherwise seems to be the prevalent trend
in the U.S., Europe and Asia. In the U.S., the rise in
inequality since the 1970s has coincided with the
rise in Mexican immigration. In Mexico, inequality has been declining since the mid-1990s, a period
during which emigration first increased to historic
highs and then declined steeply.
Our review of the literature suggests that lowskilled immigration to the U.S., much of it from
Mexico, has only played a minor role in rising
income and wage inequality. To the extent that
there is an effect, it has come through the presence of immigrants, and less as a result of immigration’s effect on natives’ wages. Immigrants’
bimodal skill distribution, with clustering at the
top and bottom of the U.S. skill distribution, has
widened the overall income distribution slightly.
At the same time, low-skilled immigration to
the U.S., and migrants’ remittances, have played
a large role in lowering global inequality by moving millions of low-income Mexican families further away from poverty and closer to the global
middle class.
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Migration from poor to rich countries represents a reallocation of labor that increases the
wage of the migrant while also raising wages in
the sending country. It moves labor to capital-rich
countries where businesses readily employ it.
Productivity and output rise. As long as business
investment responds to the worker influx, wage
effects on native workers will be limited.
Migration is the last frontier of globalization.
Removing barriers to international mobility would

result in large economic gains that far outweigh
any costs. The problem policymakers face is not
that migration doesn’t create gains, it’s who gets
the gains. In the policy discussion, we noted a
number of policies that help alleviate wage and income inequality, including managed, legal avenues
for work-based migration. Innovative policy tools
can redistribute the gains from migration; this is
preferable to cutting it off.
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